Cornell Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 5 July 1991

Article 5

Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed
Amendment to the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act
Kristen L . Boyles

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kristen L . Boyles, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act , 76 Cornell L. Rev.
1117 (1991)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol76/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

NOTE
SAVING SACRED SITES: THE 1989 PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
Holding the pipe up with its stem to the heavens, she said: "With
this sacred pipe you will walk upon the Earth; for the Earth is your
Grandmother and Mother, and She is sacred. Every step that is
taken upon Her should be as a prayer."
Black Elk, Oglala Sioux, 19531

For countless years, American Indians 2 have worshipped at natural sites, 3 holding the sites sacred. Since the adoption of the first
amendment, Congress and the courts have zealously protected the
right to freely practice a religion of choice.4 However, the religious
beliefs of many American Indians do not follow lines traditionally
recognized by Judeo-Christian culture. 5 As a result, policy makers
1

BLACK ELK, THE SACRED PIPE: BLACK ELK's ACCOUNr OF THE SEVEN RrrEs OF THE

OGLALA Sioux 5-6 (Joseph Epes Brown ed. 1953) (footnote omitted). For a discussion
of the role of women in Indian culture, see PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop

(1986).
2 Although the terms "Indian" and "Native American" can be used interchangeably, "Indian" will be used throughout this Note to refer to indigenous peoples of the
United States. Many Indian tribes and people themselves prefer the term Indian. See
STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE (1988).

3 Various kinds of natural sites are sacred to different Indian tribes. Ranging from
the small and unnamed to the grand in scale, sacred natural sites typically include mountain peaks, hot springs, tipi rings, ancestral tribal lands, and valley overlooks. For Karuk
Indians, Mount Shasta, at 14,162 feet in California, is a sacred place vital for the healing
of the earth. HearingBefore the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, United States Senate: Oversight
Hearing to Discuss Issues of Concern to Central and Northern California Tribes, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 35 (1989) [hereinafter Hearing, California Tribes] (statement of Charles Thom, Sr.,
hereditary medicine man and ceremonial leader of the Karuk tribe, Northern California).
Indian religions are not alone in holding certain sites sacred: "Our religions have
their Jerusalems, Mount Calvarys, Vaticans, and Meccas. We hold sacred Bethlehem,
Nazareth, the Mount of Olives, and the Wailing Wall." 124 CONG. REC. 21,444 (daily
ed. July 18, 1978) (statement of Rep. Udall of Arizona).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ......

5 For further discussion of various Indian religious traditions, see AMERIAN INDIAN
PROPHETS (Clifford E. Trafzer ed. 1986); BLACK ELK, supra note 1; W.Y. EvANs-WENTz,
CUCHAMA AND SACRED MOUNTAINS (1981); CATHERINE FEHER-ELSTON, CHILDREN OF SACRED GROUND (1988); PETERJ. POWELL, SWEET MEDICINE (1969); SEEING WITH A NATIVE

EYE (Walter Holden Capps ed. 1976); HYEMEYOHSTS STORM, SEVEN ARROWS (1972); and
TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock eds. 1975).
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often discount or ignore Indian beliefs. Government agencies frequently make public land management decisions that affect Indian
sacred sites located on federal land without considering Indian religion. 6 This lack of cultural sensitivity continually threatens the
practice of Indian religion. Historically, Indians found European
settlers intolerant of their religions. 7 Today, the threat to Indian
religion arises not from crusading missionaries, but from federal
policies based largely on ignorance.
In 1978, Congress responded to this threat by passing the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).8 The Act's
avowed purpose was to protect Indian religion and Indian sacred
land. In practice, AIRFA has failed to protect Indian sacred sites on
public lands. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,9 the United States Supreme Court denied an injunction request
from Indians to stop road building and timber harvesting on traditionally sacred land in California. The Court's decision demonstrated AIRFA's inability to protect Indian sacred land sites.
Congress recently appeared willing to amend and strengthen
AIRFA. On September 28, 1989, the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs held hearings on Senate Bill 1124, the "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1989." 10 The proposed amendment directed federal agencies to manage federal
lands in a way that "shall not . . . pose a substantial and realistic
threat of undermining and frustrating such [Indian] religion or religious practice.""1 In addition, the amendment created a private
6

See infra text accompanying notes 41-46.

7

U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE: AMERICAN INDIAN RELI-

GIous FREEDOM ACT REPORT 1-8 (Aug. 1979) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
A missionary once undertook to instruct a group of Indians in the truths
of his holy religion. He told them of the creation of the earth in six days,
and of the fall of our first parents by eating an apple. The courteous
savages listened attentively, and, after thanking him, one related in his
turn a very ancient tradition concerning the origin of maize. But the missionary plainly showed his disgust and disbelief, indignantly saying:
"What I delivered to you were sacred truths, but this that you tell me is

mere fable and falsehood!"
VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 99 (1973) (quoting Dr. Charles Eastman).

8 Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)). In
several early cases and acts, the government and the courts recognized the important
connection between tribes and their land. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 19, § 8,

1 Stat. 329, 330 (1793).
9 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
10 S.1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see Hearings Before the United States Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs: S.1124, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of
1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Hearings S. 1124].

11

S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(2) (1989).
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cause of action enforceable in United States district courts. 12
This Note concentrates on several aspects of the proposed legislation. Part I surveys the general precepts of several different Indian religions. Part I also discusses AIRFA's enactment history,
court cases interpreting AIRFA's scope, and the attempt to amend
AIRFA in 1988. Part II details the 1989 proposed amendment and
the need for such legislation. Part III concludes that the 1989
amendment, by providing a standard analogous to that in traditional
free-exercise analysis of Indian site-specific religions, does not violate the establishment clause.' 3 Challenges to the 1989 amendment
centered on a perceived establishment clause conflict. Perhaps because of concern over its constitutional dimensions, the 1989
amendment has not been re-introduced during the 1990 or 1991
congressional sessions. 14 Any amendment attempt will inevitably
confront the question of constitutional validity. A discussion of S.
1124's constitutional dimensions sheds light on AIRFA's entire

amendment process. Clearly, this is an issue that will not go away in
the near future. With certain language clarification, this Note urges
Congress to re-introduce and enact the 1989 amendment.
Id. § 3(c)(1).
See supra note 4.
14 As is the nature of legislation, two significant changes have occurred in AIRFA's
amendment process since the hearings on amendment S. 1124. On November 21, 1989,
Senator Inouye of Hawaii (chairperson of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs) introduced another amendment bill. S. 1979, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REc. S16,799-800 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). Responding both to AIRFA's ineffectiveness and the Supreme Court's holding in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), Senator Inouye announced that "there must be a
rebalancing of governmental interests against Native American religious interests." 135
CONG. REC. S16,800. S. 1979 is an extensive amendment attempt, with sections covering definitions, policy, federal-Indian consultation, and excavations. Moreover, S. 1979
responds to AIRFA's shortcomings by mandating extensive cooperation and communication between federal agencies and Indian traditional or governmental leaders. S.
1979, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1989).
On January 14, 1991, Senator Inouye again introduced AIRFA legislation. S. 110,
102 Cong., Ist Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S763 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991). In virtually identical language to that used on behalf of S. 1979, Senator Inouye announced that S. 110
was "[a] bill to remove barriers to the free exercise of, and to ensure equal respect for,
and treatment of, traditional religious practices by Indians, Alaska Natives, and native
Hawaiians." Id S. 110 addresses regulations and consultation between federal agencies
and Indian tribes. It prohibits federal agency action that would disturb the integrity of a
sacred site or the exercise of a religious ceremony unless the agency proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed action fulfills a compelling federal interest. Even
if such an interest is shown, the agency must propose means with the least potential to
disturb the site or ceremony. S. 110 also provides for de novo review by a United States
district court of the factual record compiled by the federal agency as its decisional basis.
Injunctions and attorneys' fees and costs may be awarded by the court.
Although these amendments represent refinements of S. 1124, their constitutional
viability remains a central question. Since this Note argues that S. 1124 is constitutionally valid, any proposed amendments with clearer constitutional dimensions should also
pass muster.
12
13
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I
THE EVOLVING NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATION

A.

The Historical Loss of the Continent

The growth of the United States from a band of colonies to a
transcontinental nation drove Indians from their native lands. The
Supreme Court refused to recognize the Indians' legal title to the
land in Johnson v. M'Intosh. 15 In Johnson, Justice Marshall pronounced the doctrine of discovery, declaring that conquest determined title to the land.' 6 The new Americans excelled at conquest.
In 1778, the first treaty signed by the United States established the
Lenape or Delaware Nation territory; thirty years later this nation
had disappeared. 17 The government granted the Black Hills of
South Dakota to the Indians in 1868. To the Sioux, Cheyenne, and
Arapaho Indians, the Black Hills, Paha Sapa, was the center of the
world, a place of holy mountains. Four years after the signing of the
treaty of the Black Hills, white miners considered the Black Hills
sacred for another reason: gold. By 1876, Indian tribes were driven
from this region promised to them forever."1
As two systems of values and cultures clashed, Indians lost all
but isolated patches of the continent to the onslaught of white settlers. 19 Between 1850 and 1900, Indians lost extensive lands as
white settlers moved West. 20 During that period, many tribal members echoed the sentiments of a chief of the northern Blackfeet:
15 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Chief Justice John Marshall declared that the
right of discovery by the Europeans extinguished any Indian title to the continent.
"Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny ... ." Id at 588.
Marshall continued to explain that to leave the Indians in possession of the continent
would be to leave the continent a wilderness. Id at 590.
16 Id. at 587.
17 PETER MATrHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 5 (1984). Between 1779 and 1871, the
United States Congress ratified 371 treaties with different Indian nations. REx WEYLER,
BLOOD OF THE LAND 65 (1982).
18 DEE BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 264-96 (1970); see VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1969).
19 For a historical overview of the most tumultuous period in American Indian
modern history, see PHILIP WEEKS, FAREWELL, My NATION: THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND
THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1890 (1990). For a historical account of the Cherokee Indian
Nation, see JOHN EHLE, TRIAL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
(1988).
20 Beginning in the 1850s, the reservation system came into existence. This system
confined Indians to land completely surrounded and controlled by private landholders,
the States, the territories, or the federal government. Also, the transcontinental railroad, completed in 1869, linked the continent and brought settlers to previously remote
areas. Soon after the completion of the railroad, the great buffalo herds, essential to the
traditional existence of the Plains Indians, disappeared. DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES
F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 102-03 (1986). For an in-depth discussion of several treaty histories, see FORKED TONGUES AND BROKEN TREATIES (Donald E. Worcester
ed. 1975).
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"Our land is more valuable than your money. It will last forever ....
we will give you anything we have that you can take with
you; but the land, never." 21 Despite this uncompromising stance,
22
Indians were unable to keep their land.
As the land was seized, federal Indian law developed in a reactionary manner in response to the changing desires of the dominant
white culture. 23 The unique relationship between Congress and In24
dian tribes sprang mainly from a common desire for the land.
Two different philosophies motivated each side. The Indians
viewed the land in terms of stewardship; the white culture wanted
ownership. 25 As Chief Red Cloud of the Lakota said, "They made
many promises to us, but they only kept one: they promised to take

our land, and they took it."26
Although Congress traditionally held fiduciary and plenary
T.C. McLuHAN, TOUCH THE EARTH 53 (1971).
22 American Indians have recently begun asserting claims to their lands. See, e.g.,
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (Indian tribe claim for damages representing fair rental value of land owned and occupied by New York counties
allowed under federal common law), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985). Extensive land
claims by the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the Houlton Band of
Maliseet Indians were settled out of court with the passage of the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act of 1980. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1988). This Act extinguished all aboriginal title and remaining Indian claims, enabled the purchase of 305,000 acres for the
tribes, and created a $27 million trust fund with quarterly payments to the Passamaquoddies and Penobscots. Congress also enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act of
1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1988). This Act allows tribes to adopt land consolidation plans to eliminate fractional property interests and to combine tribal land holdings.
23 As trustee for American Indian tribes, Congress has almost unlimited power over
Indian affairs. For this reason, Indian law and history are hopelessly intertwined. American Indian law has swung through various extremes during its relatively short history.
From 1776 to 1871, the United States tended to treat Indians as separate nationsdrawing straight line boundaries delineating Indian and non-Indian country. In the
mid-1850s, the reservation system came into existence as settlers moved westward and
began to increasingly encounter the Indians. The United States government still considered the Indians semisovereign nations during this expansion period, as evidenced by
the government's desire to make treaties with the various tribes.
In 1871 two important changes occurred. First, all treaties with the Indians ended.
Second, Congress passed the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), apportioning land to
individual Indians and non-Indians alike. Until 1928, the avowed policy of the federal
government was total assimilation of the Indians into the white culture. The government passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1928, signaling a brief period of selfdetermination for Indian tribes. This period ended in 1948 with the implementation of
the termination program. With this program, the federal policy performed an aboutface in seeking complete integration of Indians into American society, thereby extinguishing tribal status. Around 1961, the government again revised its attitude toward
Indians and commenced a policy of Indian self-determination. This particular policy has
lasted until the present. Unfortunately, there are signs of increasing public resentment
of the "special status" of Indians. Time will only tell if we are headed for another assimilationist period. See D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 33-159.
24 R. WEYLER, supra note 17, at 14-15.
25 Id. at 15.
26
Id at 65.
21
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power over the gamut of Indian affairs, 27 modem cases signal that
the Bill of Rights applies to Indians in almost the same way as it
does to other citizens. 28 In only two areas, trust land holdings 29 and
political treatment of tribes,3 0 does Congress's fiduciary or plenary
power alter the application of the Bill of Rights to Indians. Because
neither of these areas concerns sacred sites, 3 ' this Note follows an
unmodified first amendment analysis.
B.

Foundations of Indian Religious Practices

The federal government now owns roughly three-quarters of a
billion acres of public land.3 2 Because Indians once held all this
land, much of it contains sites sacred to Indian religious beliefs.
Many Indians believe that their sacred sites were stolen from them.
One Lakota chief protested, "we never gave up the Black Hills or
the buffalo country, never! That is our church; we never sold our
33
church."
Indian tribes generally believe that these sacred sites must be
left untouched and undisturbed.3 4 The Navajo Indians, for exam35
ple, believe that spiritual beings inhabit certain natural places.
These sites become relatives and family with whom the Navajo must
27 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (Indian tribes fall under the control of the federal, not state, government. "These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation." Id. at 383.).
28 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, reh'g denied, 471
U.S. 1062 (1985); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
29 See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 416-17 (because Indian land is held in trust by the
federal government, Congress may manage the land in ways that would violate the just
compensation clause if applied to private land holdings).
30 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (singling out Indian tribes
does not violate the equal protection clause because "Indian" is a political, not racial,
category).
31 The sacred sites covered by AIRFA are not on land held in trust for the Indians.
In addition, Morton, in labeling Indian status as a political category, did not address
Indian religion or possible religious discrimination.
32
NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE AssOCIA-bON, WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 421
(1988). This 1985 statistic of 740,885,157.6 acres includes land controlled by the Bureau of Land Management, United States Forest Service, Bureau of Reclamation, United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Park Service, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Army Corps of Engineers, Army, Navy, Department of Energy, and Bureau of Indian
Affairs.

33 R. WEYLER, supra note 17, at 28 (quoting Lakota Chief Matthew King).
34 Generalizations about Indian beliefs must yield to the fact that each tribe has its
own cultural and religious identity. In short, Indian tribes and religions cannot be
lumped into one category. See infra notes 35-40, 47-55 and accompanying text.
35 Many Navajos believe that the San Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National
Forest in Arizona are intrinsically sacred. They believe that specific gods live on the
Peaks and perform specific religious ceremonies there. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735,
738 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984). The
Hopi Indians similarly believe that the Peaks are sacred. According to the Hopi, emissaries of the Creators, the Kachinas, live on the Peaks for six months every year. Id
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stay. "We cannot make prayers at any spring or rock, only the ones
where we know the spiritual beings. These places are sacred to us.
36
We cannot practice our religion anywhere else."'
Indians value these sites in at least two ways.3 7 First, Indians
need access to the sites for religious ceremonies. Such rituals indude gathering medicine, healing the sick, speaking with the gods,
or performing religious obligations.38 For example, the PaiuteShoshone people of California believe that a hot spring is the site of
their creation; as such, it is a healing place. Religious ceremonies
for elders and the sick use the water, the vapor, and the mud of the
hot spring.3 9 Similarly, the Chumash Indians help the deceased in
their journey to the spiritual world by burying a medicine bundle on
40
the top of Santa Lucia Peak in California.
Even though AIRFA directs federal agencies to preserve access
for worship at sacred sites, the government has largely ignored this
policy directive in these two instances. The Paiute-Shoshone hot
spring is located in Channel Lake Naval Weapons Center. The Navy
and the Department of Energy use the site for geothermal development. The Navy denies the Indians access to the hot spring for sacred ceremonies, but regularly allows academic archaeologists on
the site.4 1 The Chumash Indians have not fared much better. Citing fire hazards, the United States Forest Service has blocked their
42
access to Santa Lucia and told them to use another peak.
Federal courts have also allowed interference with and destruction of these sites. In two cases, government dams flooded sacred
36 Improvement of the American Indian Religious FreedomAct: Hearingon S.2250 Before the
United States Senate Select Comm. on IndianAffairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings S. 2250] (affidavit of Kee Shay, Navajo Tribe of Arizona).
37
Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 771, 778 n.48, 791 n.138
(1987) (authored by Mark S. Cohen) (contrasting claims about site access and intrinsic
sacredness of the site).
38

See AKE

HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS

103-15 (1979);

LAURA THOMPSON & ALICEJOSEPH, THE Hopi WAY 36-38 (1944).
39 American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.. Res. 102

Before the United States
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 193-94 (1978) [hereinafter
AIRFA Hearings] (statement of Stephen Rios, Executive Secretary, Native American Heritage Commission).

Id at 194.
Id
Id Interestingly, the Secretary of the Interior in 1980 unhesitantly endorsed the
continuation of an annual Christian Easter pageant at Wichita Mountains National Wildlife Refuge in Oklahoma. Citing the fact that "Holy City," a group of backdrop structures for the pageant, had been there for 45 years, the Secretary asserted, "No one is
going to disturb the observance or the sacred symbols on that refuge as long as I am
Secretary of the Interior." Indian Religious Freedom Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-57
(1982) [hereinafter Judiciary Hearing] (memo from Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of
Interior).
40
41
42
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sites and rendered them completely unreachable. 43 In other instances, the federal government built a road through a sacred site4 4
and allowed a ski resort to be constructed on a place of worship. 4 5
Such destruction of sacred sites harms more than the religion of the
Indian tribes; it undermines their existence as a people:
[I]n the long run if the expansion is permitted, we will not be able
successfully to teach our people that this is a sacred place. If the
ski resort remains or is expanded, our people will not accept the
view that this is the sacred Home of the Kachinas. The basis of
our existence as a society will become a mere fairy tale to our
46
people.
Indians also value the sites in a second and more central way.
To many Indians, the sites themselves, apart from the ceremonies
performed there, have deep religious significance and spiritual importance. 47 One scholar has noted: "[O]nce a site is chosen by the
gods as a place of sacred value, that sacredness continues to reside
there for eternity ....

Sacred places transcend human history and

are places of inexhaustible power and spiritual energy. They are not
48
merely sites of convenience."
According to many Indian religions, the physical world continually threatens to return to its original state of chaos:
[I]f we abandon our land, who will return the balance and harmony to the earth when it is necessary. If we are not there, everything will fall more and more out of balance and our religious
prophecies teach us that very bad things will happen and the
49
world may end.

Consistent with this philosophy, Yakima Indians believe that they
are the keepers of the continent;5 0 Hopi Indians believe that they
must guard the land through prayers and religious traditions. 5 1
43 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), af'd,
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F.
Supp. 641 (Utah 1977), aff'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981).
44 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
45 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
46
Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740 n.2.
47 David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 769, 820-23 (1991).
48 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 42, at 105 (manuscript by David Carrasco, Sacred
Space and Religious Vision in World Religions: A Context to Understand the Religious
Claims of the Kootenai Indians).
49 HearingsS. 2250, supra note 36, at 271 (affidavit of Violet Ashkie, Navajo Tribe of
Arizona).
50 AIRFA Hearings, supra note 39, at 31-37 (statement of Johnson J. Meninick,
Yakima Tribe of Washington).
51
P. MATrHIEsSEN, supra note 17, at 79.
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For Indians, the place where the natural and the supernatural
mix creates a reference point for our world and keeps it from
chaos. 52 Such a belief explains the significance of the sacred sites;
an undisturbed sacred site bridges the "real" world and the world of
the supernatural. 5 Sacred sites hold balance and harmony for the
world.5 4 Sacred sites also often link Indians and their creation beliefs. 55 Bear Butte, near Sturgis, South Dakota, is the creation place
for both the Oglala Sioux and the Northern Cheyenne Indians. It is
also a state park. The development and modification of these sites
has destroyed these Indians' religions, turned their order into
chaos, erased their reference points for the world, and changed forever the Indian people.
C. A Legislative Response: The American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978
AIRFA succinctly expresses an important policy objective of
Congress, and its language echoes a theme from the Bill of Rights.
In its entirety, the first and controlling section of AIRFA reads:
Henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom
to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including
but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
56
traditional rites.
The second and last section of the Act requires the Executive to
The Hopi have been placed on this side of the Earth to take care of the
land through their ceremonial duties, just as other races of people have
been placed elsewhere around the Earth to take care of her in their own
ways. Together we hold the world in balance, revolving properly. If the
Hopi Nation vanishes, the motion of the Earth will become eccentric, the
water will swallow the land, and the people will perish.
R.

WEYLER,

supra note 17, at 274 (interview of Dan Katshongva, Sun Clan).

52 WILLIAM E. COFFER, SPIRITS OF THE SACRED MOUNTAINS 51-52 (1978); MIRCEA
ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 29-54 (1959).
53 See P. MATrHIESSEN, supra note 17, at 116-21; Alfonso Ortiz, The Tewa World View,
in TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH 179-89 (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock
eds. 1975).
54 A. HULTKRANTZ, supra note 38, at 60-64; JOHN UPTON TERRELL, THE NAVAJos 3
(1970); L. THOMPSON & A. JOSEPH, supra note 38, at 52.

55

You know, everything had to begin, and this is how it was: the Kiowas
came one by one into the world through a hollow log. They were many
more than now, but not all of them got out. There was a woman whose
body was swollen up with child, and she got stuck in the log. After that,
no one could get through, and that is why the Kiowas are a small tribe in
number. They looked all around and saw the world. It made them glad
to see so many things. They called themselves KWUDA, "coming out."
Kiowa folk tale, reprinted in N. SCorr MOMADAY, THE NAMES 1 (1976).
56 Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)).
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prepare a task force report on federal agency practices and policies
57
regarding Indian religions.
The limited scope of the legislation aroused little debate; 58 its
enactment was largely unopposed. 5 9 In later interpretations,
AIRFA would be noted mostly for what it did not contain. It did not
create any right to civil action to enforce its provisions; it merely
stated policy objectives. AIRFA did not instruct agencies to consider the possible impact to Indian religions in their decisionmaking; it only emphasized that the government should comply with the
first amendment's directive that Congress shall make no laws
abridging the free exercise of religion. 60
AIRFA's legislative history provides a picture of the types of
religious violations contemplated by Congress. Congress acknowl6
edged the need for ensured access to certain physical locations. '
Additionally, Congress sought to permit the use of substances with
religious significance and to prevent interference in ongoing
ceremonies by government officials. 62 Congress concluded that
"America does not need to violate the religions of her native peoples. There is room for and great value in cultural and religious
Id § 2, 92 Stat. 469.
A supporter of the Act asserted that it "is not conveying any right to anybody."
124 CONG. REC. 21,445 (daily ed.July 18, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Roncalio, Democrat of
Wyoming).
59 AIRFA Hearings, supra note 39. S.J. Res. 102 passed in the Senate on April 3,
1978 and an amended version, incorporating text from H.R.J. Res. 738, passed on July
27, 1978. 124 CONG. REc. 8365-66, 23,078-79 (1978). AIRFA passed in the House on
July 18, 1978. Id. at 21,451. President Carter signed AIRFA in August, 1978. 14
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1417-18 (Aug. 12, 1978).
60 H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
57
58

ADMIN. NEWS

1262, 1262.

The legislative history shows Congress's increased sensitivity to Indian access to
sacred sites. "To deny access to them is analogous to preventing a non-Indian from
entering his church or temple." Id. at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
61

NEWS

1262, 1263.

Peyote, a mild hallucinogen, is used in religious ceremonies of the Native American Church. Its religious use is protected under federal law. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31
(1989) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to
the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from
registration."); see also Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin. (DEA), 878 F.2d 1458, 146364 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining DEA's rationale for the exception). Some officials, unaware of peyote's protected status, have confiscated the plant. See generally SILVESTER J.
BRrro, THE WAY OF A PEYOTE ROADMAN (1989); TONY HILLERmAN, PEOPLE OF DARKNESS
(1980); OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION (1908); J.S. Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in
TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH, supra note 53, at 96-104.
Narcotics officers have seized bags of pine needles or sweet grass, mistaking these
plants for drugs. Officials have also confiscated feathers of common birds, assuming
they come from an endangered species. Eagle feathers can be passed down for generations within a family without violating the protected status of the bird. See H.R. REP. No.
1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1262,
1264.
62
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diversity. We would be poorer if these American Indian religions
disappeared from the face of the Earth." 6 3 AIRFA appeared to be
a step toward increased government understanding of Indian
religions. 64
1. AIRFA's Extent and Coverage
Despite its apparent broad sweep, AIRFA created no private
cause of action or any other enforcement mechanism. The Act
aimed only to fill a gap in governmental policy that allowed agencies
to infringe on the practice of native traditional religions. 6 5 In fact,
the Act provided no new protection for Indian religion. It merely
emphasized the importance of considering religion when formulating government policy. Although AIRFA stressed protection and
preservation, it had no enforcement provisions. As a supporter of
the Act, Congressman Udall seemed to marginalize the legislation
by stating, "[the resolution] simply says to our managers of public
lands that they [Indians] ought to be encouraged to use these
' 66
places. It has no teeth in it. It is the sense of the Congress.
Section two of AIRFA directed the Executive to evaluate its policies and procedures in consultation with native traditional religious
leaders. 6 7 Accordingly, the Carter administration established a task
force comprised of representatives of federal agencies. The task
force's report identified 522 instances where federal agencies violated Indian religious practices in 1978 and 1979.68 On the Hawaiian islands of Kahoolawe, Koa, and Oahu, for example, the United
States Navy used sites sacred to Native Hawaiians as bombing
ranges. 69 Members of the Mescalero Apache tribe also were denied
access to their sacred mountain sites: Guadalupe Peak, Organ
Mountain, Three Sisters, and Oscura Peak in New Mexico. In Montana, oil wells were drilled in the middle of traditional tipi rings. At
present none of the task force's recommendations has been
70
adopted.
63
H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1262, 1264.
64 See generally Ellen M.W. Sewell, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIz.
L. RE v. 429 (1983).
65 H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1262, 1264.

66

124 CONG. REC. 21, 444-45 (1978).

67

42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).

68 TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
69 The United States Navy used the 27,000-acre island of Kahoolawe for target
bombing practice from 1953 until November 5, 1990. However, the recent halt may be
short-lived. Navy officials are pushing for an executive order from President Bush to
resume use of the island. Military Still Wants Access to Hawaiian Island, N.Y. Times, Dec.

20, 1990, at B20, col. 1.
70

D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 569. The task force recom-
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Federal Court Interpretations of AIRFA

Several federal court interpretations of AIRFA illustrate its
toothlessness. 7 1 The court in Crow v. Gullet 7 2 held that AIRFA
"does not create a cause of action in federal courts for violation of
rights of religious freedom." 78 In Wilson v. Block, 74 the court made it
clear that AIRFA merely required an agency to solicit and consider
the opinions of Indian leaders, but it did not require these opinions
to have a binding effect on federal administrators. 75 Finally, in
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,76 while the
court found a violation of Indians' first amendment free exercise
clause rights, it ruled that there had been sufficient compliance with
AIRFA because studies had been conducted and hearings had been
77
held.
The Supreme Court first considered AIRFA in 1986 when it
heard Bowen v. Roy. 78 Although the case did not involve a sacred
site, it did address the issue of agency infringement on freedom to
worship, an area also covered by AIRFA. 79 Roy, a member of the
Abenaki Indian tribe, refused to obtain a Social Security number for
his daughter, Little Bird of Snow. Roy contended that the representation of his daughter by a unique number violated the family's religious beliefs. 80 Because Roy's youngest daughter did not have a
mended new legislation in six areas: creation of federal land-use designation for areas
containing sites or shrines; removal of statutory provisions which restrict Indian access
to religious sites; permission for withholding information from the public about sacred
sites; restriction of exports of objects sacred to Indians; exemption for Indians to import
sacred objects duty free; and prohibition of the unauthorized removal of religious objects from Indian or Eskimo land. Id; see 137 CONG. REC. S763 (daily ed.Jan. 14, 1991)
(statement of Senator Inouye).
71 Only one district court case has given AIRFA any weight. In United States v.
Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 266-69 (D.S.D. 1985), the court held that a Forest Service
refusal to issue a permit for the Black Hills was arbitrary and capricious because the lack
of meaningful consultation with Indian religious leaders conflicted with AIRFA.
72 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
73
Id. at 793.
74 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
75 Id. at 746-47.
76 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
77
Id. at 597-98.
78 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
79 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
80 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696.
[Q.] Mr. Roy, could you explain why obtaining a Social Security Number
for Little Bird of Snow would be contrary to your religious beliefs as
a native Abenaki?
[A.] Yes. Because we felt that this number would be used to rob her of
her ability to have greater power in that this number is a unique
number. It serves unique purposes. It's applied to her and only her;
and being applied to her, that's what offends us, and we try to keep
her person unique, and we try to keep her spirit unique, and we're
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Social Security number, the government terminated a portion of the
family's federal public assistance.
Roy contended that under either AIRFA or the free exercise
clause, his family was entitled to an exemption from the Social Security number requirement. The Court held that the free exercise
clause did not require the government to conduct its internal affairs
in ways that comported with the religious beliefs of citizens.8 1 The
Court also noted that AIRFA "accurately identified the mission of
the Free Exercise Clause itself."'8 2 Under either analysis, the Court
noted that the federal government did not impair Roy's freedom to
83
believe, express, and exercise his religion.
The Supreme Court applied the Bowen approach to sacred sites
in the 1988 case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.84 Citing Bowen extensively, the Lyng Court held that neither the
free exercise clause nor AIRFA could protect sacred Indian sites
from federal development.
In Lyng, the United States Forest Service wanted to build a sixmile paved road through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers
National Forest in California.8 5 Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians
traditionally used this forest area for religious purposes. 86 The Forest Service commissioned a study of the American Indian cultural
and religious sites in the area. The study found that the entire
Chimney Rock section was an indispensable part of Indian religious
life: "[S]uccessful use of the [area for Indian religious purposes] is
dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical
environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and
an undisturbed natural setting.... [The road] would cause serious
and irreparable damage to the sacred areas." 8 7 Based on these findings, the study recommended that the road not be completed. Despite AIRFA's stated policy to protect and preserve access to sacred
sites, the Forest Service ignored this recommendation.
The Supreme Court concluded that neither the free exercise
scared that if we were to use this number, she would lose control of
that and she would have no ability to protect herself from any evil
that that number might be used against her.
Id. at 697 n.3.
81 Id at 700. "As a result," said the Court, "Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter
than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size and color of the Government's
filing cabinets." Id
82 Idt
83
Id. at 700-01.
84 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
85 IdL at 442.
86
d
87

ld.
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clause of the first amendment nor AIRFA prohibited the government from constructing the road or harvesting timber on this sacred
land.8 8 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found this case
indistinguishable from Bowen v. Roy: "The building of a road or the
harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be
distinguished from the use of a Social Security number."8 9 Because
internal agency procedures guided the decision to build the road
and harvest timber, the Court refused to hold that this particular
government action unconstitutionally violated Indian religious
freedom. 90
The Lyng decision destroyed any effectiveness that AIRFA may
have had. Justice O'Connor's opinion proclaimed that "[n]owhere
in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause
of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights." 9 1 The
Court's decision meant that AIRFA only required agencies to pay lip
service to Indian views, and confirmed that AIRFA never gave Indians an enforceable veto over any government development or dis92
turbance of sacred lands.
88
Id at 441-42. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, and Justices White,
Stevens, Scalia, and ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined her opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
89
Id at 449.
90 Id at 450. The Indians argued that indirect coercion or penalties on the free
exercise of religion should be subjected to first amendment inquiry. While the Court
agreed with this argument, it doggedly maintained that the incidental effects of internal
government programs did not mandate a compelling justification from the government.
Nothing in the government actions, according to the Court, prohibited Indian religion.
Id at 450-51.
Many commentators have criticized this decision. See Donald Falk, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing First Amendment Protection of Indian Sacred Lands, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 559 (1989) ("The result... is clear: Indian
religions can be extinguished at the government's pleasure."); Note, Conduct and Belief in
the Free Exercise Clause: Developments and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 268, 289 (1990) (authored byJ. Brett Pritchard) ("The Court's refusal to extend constitutional protection to the religious practices
of the American Indians signaled a substantial retreat from . . . earlier free exercise
claims."); Note, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: A FormOver-Effect Standardfor the Free Exercise Clause, 20 Loy. U. CL LJ. 171, 196 (1988) (authored by Peggy Healy) (Noting the contradiction between the Court's sympathetic dicta
and its refusal to recognize a first amendment violation, this author asserted: "A guaranty of freedom to exercise one's religion . . . is meaningless if the conditions under
which that freedom may be exercised can be shattered. Allowing the free exercise of
religion while destroying the individual's ability to exercise that freedom is akin to granting the freedom to vote but banning elections.").
91 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
92 The Supreme Court again took notice of AIRFA's lack of real and actionable
meaning in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990). There, the Court refused to find a violation of the free exercise clause
where members of the Native American Church lost their jobs due to peyote use and
were denied state unemployment benefits. For further discussion of the facts and hold-
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1988 Amendment Attempt

Just prior to the Lyng decision, Senators Cranston, Inouye, and
DeConcini attempted to amend AIRFA in order to give the Act
some real meaning and effectiveness. 9 3 Although Congress did not
ultimately amend AIRFA, the proposed 1988 amendment and its
hearings provide a good background for the proposed 1989 amendment. The proposed 1988 amendment, S. 2250, set forth two important changes. 94 First, it set a threshold requirement for court
challenges to federal land management. The language of the
amendment called for a "historically indispensable" standard for Indian religious challenges to federal land management. Congress
never spelled out the exact definition of this standard. At the least,
tribes or tribal members would have been required to show that the
land in question was indispensable to their religion and had been
indispensable in their historic past. Several Indian advocates attacked the proposed historical and indispensable standard as too
demanding. 9 5 The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs
heard testimony suggesting the replacement of the "historically indispensable" standard with language emphasizing the whole and
complete integrity of Indian religious practices. 9 6
ing of Smith, see infra note 140. Dissenting in Smith,Justice Blackmun viewed the Court's
holding as reconfirming that "[t]he American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in itself,
[does] not create rights enforceable against government action restricting religious freedom. .. ." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1622 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For further discussion of
the original enactment of AIRFA, see Robin K. Rannow, Religion: The First Amendment
and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151 (1982);
Ellen H.W. Sewell, The American Indian Religious FreedomAct, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 429 (1983);
Howard Stamber, Manifest Destiny andAmerican Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni,
and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59 (1982); Dean B. Suagee, American Indian
Religious Freedom and CulturalResources Management: ProtectingMother Earth'sCaretakers, 10
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (1982); Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act: An Approach to ProtectingNative American Religion, 71 IowA L. REV. 869 (1986)
(authored by Diane Brazen Gould); Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act-An
Answer to the Indian's Prayers?, 29 S.D.L. REV. 131 (1983) (authored by Rex P. Craven).
93 The proposed amendment to AIRFA, S. 2250, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), was
introduced on March 31, 1988; Lyng was decided on April 19, 1988.
94
S. 2250 would have added the following provisions to AIRFA:
Sec. 3(a) Except in cases involving compelling governmental interests of the highest order, Federal lands that have been historically indispensable to a traditional American Indian religion shall not be managed
in a manner that would seriously impair or interfere with the exercise or
practice of such traditional American Indian religion.
(b) United States district courts shall have the authority to issue such
orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this section.
S. 2250, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1988).
95 Hearings S. 2250, supra note 36, at 70-73 (testimony of Steven C. Moore, Staff
Attorney, Native American Rights Fund).
96
Id. at 75 (testimony of Dr. Deward E. Walker, Jr., Professor of Anthropology,
University of Colorado at Boulder). Dr. Walker believes that this standard would encompass and protect a broader range of Indian religious practices.
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Second, the proposed amendment also established the availability of an individual cause of action in the United States district
courts. As is, AIRFA merely encourages agencies to use their discretion in order to protect and preserve traditional Indian religions.
This change would have forced the Supreme Court in Lyng to address AIRFA, its goals, and its purposes.
Unfortunately, Congress did not act on the proposed amendment. At hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, several witnesses voiced various objections to the amendment. The Department of the Interior opposed the amendment,
contending that it was "vague and unworkable" 9 7 and would "curtail the ability of the various land management agencies to carry out
the congressional mandates under which they operate." 98 The government claimed it could not even estimate the amount of federal
land covered by this bill. 99
Other witnesses, representing various timber, mining, and coal
associations, argued that proposed amendment S. 2250 would unfairly give Indians power over other interests because it effectively
gave them a veto over use of federal land. 10 0 A representative of
one of the lobbying groups also claimed that S. 2250 violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment by favoring Indian
religions.101
Other witnesses, many of whom represented various Indian
*tribes and tribal organizations, spoke in support of S. 2250. Suzan
Harjo, executive director of the National Congress of American Indians, stressed the overriding importance of religion in Indian life:
"Indian religion is not a program. Indian spirituality is a world view
and, when the last people who believe and practice traditional Indian spiritual ways would be gone, there would be no more Indian
nations. It is the fabric, the network, the glue that holds the Indian
nations together."' 10 2 Another witness disputed the Department of
the Interior's claim that conflicts between Indian religion and other
10 3
uses of public land would be more than a rare occurrence.
97 Id. at 44 (written testimony of Roland G. Robinson, deputy director, Bureau of
Land Management).
98 Id. at 45.
99

Id. at 44.

Id. at 114-20 (written testimony of Scott M. Matheson, attorney, Parsons, Bahle
& Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, on behalf of American Mining Congress, Timber Associations of California, Alaska Miners Association, Colorado Mining Association, Montana Coal Council, Nevada Mining Association, Northwest Mining Association, Utah
Mining Association, and Wyoming Mining Association).
100

101

Id. at 119-20.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 29-30 (statement of Marilyn B. Miles, attorney, California Indian Legal
Services).
102
103
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Non-Indian religious groups also backed the amendment. The
Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions expressed its support for religious freedom. "American Indians need the right to perform their
act of worship to express their inner feelings to God. If they are
denied that right, all religions are in danger of being denied that
right." 10 4 The AmericanJewish Congress also endorsed the amendment, stating that it "chart[ed] a proper course between allowing
government unfettered discretion over public lands.., and the creation of an unyielding religious servitude."' 10 5 Rather than envying
the specific mention of Indian religions in the proposed amendment, these religious organizations applauded the amendment as an
affirmation of religious liberty.
Even though Congress did not act on S. 2250, the impetus to
amend AIRFA remained.1 0 6 In January 1989, Senator Inouye announced plans for another amendment attempt.107
II
THE

1989

PROPOSED AMENDMENT: ANSWERING THE
SUPREME COURT'S CHALLENGE

On March 21, 1989, Representative Morris K. Udall expressed
disapproval of the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng and introduced
new legislation in the House of Representatives to amend
AIRFA.' 0 8 Criticizing the Supreme Court for its narrow holding in
Lyng, Representative Udall proposed changes to AIRFA to give
American Indians "a fighting chance."' 10 9
Senator McCain introduced S. 1124110 to the United States
104
Id. at 13 (statement of Monsignor Paul A. Lenz, Executive Director, Bureau of
Catholic Missions).
105 Id at 142 (statement of the American Jewish Congress).
106 It is clear therefore that mere policy statements regarding the Government's appreciation and respect of Indian traditional religious rights is
not enough.... An important first step would be the reintroduction of a
bill requiring Federal agencies to manage Federal lands so as not to impair or interfere with the exercise or practice of traditional Indian
religion.

Hearing, California Tribes, supra note 3, at 34 (statement of Marilyn B. Miles, attorney,

California Indian Legal Services).
107 135 CONG. REc. S798-99 (daily ed.Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Senator Inouye).
108
135 CONG. REC. E898 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Udall). The
House version of the amendment is H.R. 1546, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Since the
proposed Senate amendment, S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), incorporates and

expands upon the provisions of H.R. 1546, the Senate amendment will be the focus of
this Note. All analysis applies equally to both bills.
109
135 CONG. REC. E898 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Udall).
110

S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). S. 1124 reads as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States in Congress assembled,
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Senate on June 6, 1989.111 Both bills reflected congressional dissatSEcrION 1. This Act may be cited as the "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1989".
2. The Congress finds that(1) unlike any other established religion, many traditional Native
American religions are site-specific in that the Native American religions
hold certain lands or natural formations to be sacred;
(2) such sacred sites are an integral and vital part of the Native
American religions and the religious practices associated with such religions;
(3) many of these sacred sites are found on lands which were formerly part of the aboriginal territory of the Indians but which now are
held by the Federal Government; and
(4) lack of sensitivity or understanding of traditional Native American religions on the part of Federal agencies vested with the management
of Federal lands has resulted in the lack of a coherent policy for the management of sacred sites found on Federal lands and has also resulted in
the infringement of religious freedom for Native Americans.
SEC. 3. Public Law 95-341 (42 U.S.C. 1996), popularly known as
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
SEC. 3. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, Federal
lands that"(1) have historically been considered sacred and indispensable by a
traditional Native American religion, and
"(2) are necessary to the conduct of a Native American religious
practice, shall not be managed in a manner that will pose a substantial
and realistic threat of undermining and frustrating such religion or religious practice.
"(b)(1) Subsection (a) shall not apply to management decisions
which are necessary to"(A) carry out the legal responsibilities of the Federal Government,
"(B) protect a compelling governmental interest, or
"(C) protect a vested property right.
"(2) In making management decisions described in paragraph (1),
the Federal agency shall attempt to accommodate the various competing
interests and shall, to the greatest extent feasible, select the course of
action that is the least intrusive on traditional Native American religions
or religious practices.
"(3) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as requiring any
Federal agency to totally deny public access to Federal lands.
"(c)(1) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over
any civil action brought by any person to enforce the provisions of this
section and may issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the
provisions of this section.
"(2) Any person challenging a decision of a Federal agency in a civil
action brought under this subsection shall have the burden of proving
that the decision of the Federal agency will pose a substantial and realistic
threat of undermining and frustrating a traditional Native American religion or religious practice. If such threat is established, the Federal
agency shall have the burden of demonstrating that the Federal agency's
decision is based on one or more of the criteria in subsection (b)(1). If
the Federal agency's decision is found to have been based on one or
more of the criteria in subsection (b)(1), then the Federal agency shall
have the burden of proving that it selected the course of action that is the
least intrusive on the Native American religion or religious practice."
111
135 CONG. REC. S6220-21 (daily ed. June 6, 1989) (statement of Senator
McCain).
SEC.
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isfaction with the Supreme Court's narrow holding in Lyng. 11 2 With
obvious reference to the Lyng decision, the amendment's backers intended the amendment to change the result of future litigation. Indeed, Congress may have found support for this idea in the Lyng
decision itself. The Lyng Court had stated that competing demands
on government, even those concerning religion, should be left for
the legislature to reconcile.'1 3 This dicta suggested that the Court
might uphold a legislative attempt to protect Indian religion even if
4
such a law was challenged under the establishment clause."
The 1989 amendment repeats the two major provisions of the
earlier amendment attempt. First, Indians must show that histori15
cally they have held the federal lands sacred and indispensable,"
and that these sites are necessary to conduct Indian religious practices. 116 Second, S. 1124 creates an individual cause of action and
authorizes district courts to issue enforcement orders. 1 7 Therefore, S. 1124 makes the rights of Indian religious practitioners enforceable under AIRFA.
Section two of S. 1124 provides the underlying purpose of the
amendment. It points out the unique, site-specific nature of traditional Indian religions and underscores the intent of Congress to
create a coherent policy to protect Indian sacred sites located on
federal land." 8 The bill also emphasizes that these sacred sites,
although now on federal land, originally were part of the aboriginal
territory of the Indians. 19 Once lands come under the "historically
...sacred and indispensable" standard, the amendment directs that
these lands "shall not be managed in a manner that will pose a substantial and realistic threat of undermining and frustrating such reli120
gion or religious practice."'

The plaintiffs in a civil action brought under this amendment
The holding of the Court ignores the peculiarity of traditional native
American religions. These religions are different from other religions in
the sense that many of them are site specific and many of these sites are
found in nature. The Court's recent decision in effect allows the Government to totally destroy these sacred sites without constitutional restriction under the guise that such destruction does not force the Indians to
behave contrary to their religious beliefs.
135 CONG. REC. E898 (Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Udall).
1'3 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
114
See Falk, supra note 90. For a detailed discussion of this idea, see infra text accompanying notes 211-13.
115 S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(1) (1989).
116 Id § 3(a)(2).
117 Id § 3(c)1(1).
118 Id § 2(1), (2).
112

119

Id § 2(3).

120

Id § 3(a).
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have the burden of proving that an agency decision will pose this
substantial and realistic threat.' 2 ' Once such a threat is proven, the
burden of proof shifts to the federal agency to show that its decision
22
is based on one of three possible criteria specified in the bill:1

necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest; 123 necessary to carry out the legal responsibilities of the federal government; 2 4 or necessary to protect a vested property right.'2 5
Definitions of the latter two criteria are unclear. Witnesses who
testified at the initial hearings for S. 1124 voiced this concern. Notably, a witness on behalf of the Tanana Chiefs Conference of
Alaska said, "it is unclear whether [the phrase] 'legal responsibilities' includes discretionary acts by a federal land manager who has
a legal responsibility to exercise that discretion."' 2 6 A representative of the Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation attacked the legal responsibility language as providing "no standard
whatsoever."1

27

The "vested property right" language is also confusing. Specifically, it is unclear whether this language refers exclusively to third
party interests such as private leases of federal land. A broader interpretation might include agency property rights for exercising discretion in land management.1 28 Because these interpretations vary
29
considerably, some have advocated refined definitions.'
Indeed, interpretational difficulties needlessly obscure an
otherwise coherent legislative response. On one hand, section
3(b)(1)(A) may create a loophole so large that any agency decision
fits under the category "legal responsibilities of the government."
The same section, however, could be read merely to reiterate the
compelling state interest exception. Similarly, the vested property
right language of section 3(b)(1)(C) lends itself to interpretations
121

Id § 3(c)(2).

122
123
124

Id

125
126

Id § 3(b)(1)(C).

Id § 3(b)(1)(B).
Id § 3(b)(1)(A).
Hearings S. 1124, supra note 10 (statement of Will Mayo, Special Assistant to the

President, Tanana Chiefs Conference of Alaska); see also id. (statement of Reuben A.
Snake, Jr., council member, Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska) ("The criteria listed under
Sec. (3)(b)(1)(A), 'carry out the legal responsibilities of the Federal Government,' is a
loophole which will allow federal agencies to subvert the intent and purpose of the
American Indian Religious Freedome [sic] Act and should be stricken.").
127
"This particular language couldn't possibly be any broader in scope. It provides
no standard whatsoever, whereby the federal action could be measured." Id. (testimony
of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation).
128
Id. (statement of Will Mayo, Special Assistant to the President, Tanana Chiefs
Conference of Alaska).
129
Id. (testimony of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Nation).
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with differing results. This Note urges Congress to enact the 1989
amendment with clear definitions of these criteria. Before enactment, definitional uncertainties should be resolved in order for
courts and federal agencies to apply the law consistently.
Even if an agency could justify its management decisions under
any of the three criteria, section 3(b) (2) requires that the agency select the least intrusive method of acting when dealing with Indian
religion or religious practice.13 0 This provision mandates agency
consideration of alternatives when making federal land management

decisions. 131
The 1989 amendment also soothes the concerns of those opponents to the 1988 amendment who feared that Indian groups could
block non-Indian public access to federal lands.' 3 2 The 1989 bill
explicitly states that the amendment shall not be interpreted to require any agency to deny public access to federal lands.' 33
III
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE

1989

AIRFA AMENDMENT LEGISLATION
If Congress amends AIRFA with a bill similar to S. 1124, parties
opposed to any limitations on federal land management could challenge the enactment on constitutional grounds. Mining and timber
interests will undoubtedly argue that the establishment clause of
the first amendment' 34 prohibits such legislation. Ranching and
archaeological interests opposed the 1988 proposed AIRFA amendment and may do so again.' 3 5 Such challenges would be overcome,
however, because the 1989 amendment does not violate the
Constitution.
Both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause limit
government interaction with religion. These interactions can be
130

S. 1124, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(b)(2) (1989) ("In making management deci-

sions ... the Federal agency shall attempt to accommodate the various competing interests and shall, to the greatest extent feasible, select the course of action that is the least
intrusive on traditional Native American religions or religious practices.").
131 This portion of S. 1124 mimics other laws which require agencies to consider
alternative plans. Cf National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4322 (1988); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
132
Hearings S. 2250, supra note 36, at 114 (statement of Scott M. Matheson, Parsons,

Behle & Latimer). Justice Brennan recognized this concern in his dissent from the Lyng
decision. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452

(1988).
134

S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(3) (1989).
See supra note 4.

135

Hearings S. 2250, supra note 36, at 152 (statement by the Public Lands Council,

133

National Cattlemen's Association and National Wool Growers Association); id. at 367
(comments by the Society for American Archaeology).
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viewed in one of three ways. First, the free exercise clause may require government accommodation of religious practices. Since the
Supreme Court in Lyng ruled that federal land management dedsions do not burden free exercise rights, 3 6 the amendment does
not fall into this category and is therefore not required by the free
exercise clause.
Second, the establishment clause could prohibit government
action that accommodates religion or prefers one religion over another. In Larson v. Valente,13 7 the Supreme Court outlined the standard with which to interpret statutes that construct "explicit and
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations."1 38 This Note contends that the amendment does not belong
in this category either.
Third, some government actions involving religion are neither
prohibited nor required by the first amendment religion clauses.
Lemon v. Kurtzman 139 dealt with statutes that accommodated religion
in general, without singling out particular religions. This Note argues that the amendment should be placed and analyzed in this
category.
A. Traditional Free Exercise Analysis and Lyng's Narrow
Standard
When the Supreme Court decided Lyng, traditional free exercise clause doctrine was fairly well established.' 40 Specifically, tradiSee supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
456 U.S. 228, reh'g denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
Id. at 246-47 n.23.
139
403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
140
Free exercise analysis took a dramatic turn in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'gdenied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990). The
majority opinion, written byJustice Scalia, held that the right of free exercise of religion
did not exempt individuals from compliance with generally applicable neutral lawseven if the laws proscribed or required conduct contrary to or forbidden by the individual's religious practice. Id. at 1599-1601. Respondents were Oregon members of the
Native American Church-an Indian religious organization which uses peyote, a mild
hallucinogen, for sacramental purposes. The State of Oregon defines the possession of
peyote as a Class B felony. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987); OR. ADMIN. R. 85550-021(3)(s) (1988). Because of their peyote use, respondents not only lost their jobs,
but they were also denied state unemployment benefits for "misconduct." Smith, 110 S.
Ct. at 1598. The Court found no violation of the free exercise clause. Indeed, Justice
Scalia went even further and virtually struck down the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector's spiritual development." To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is
"compelling"-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law
136

137
138
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tional free exercise clause cases delineate a two-step analysis. Is the
government placing a burden on the free exercise of a religious be-

lief?14 1 If so, can the burden be justified by a compelling state
42

interest?
Lyng narrowed this analysis. Relying on Bowen, the Court ruled
that internal government decisions do not technically violate the
free exercise clause, even though, as in this case, completion of the
logging road could "virtually destroy the... Indians' ability to practice their religion."' 14 3 According to the Court, if the executive
branch could characterize its actions as internal functions, the gov144
ernment's actions fell beyond the scope ofjudicial review.
This excessive formalism has shifted the Court's focus from the
type of government restriction to the effect of the government action.' 4 5 After Lyng and the recent Supreme Court holding in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 1 46 the
amendments are not required by the free exercise clause.
When Congress originally passed AIRFA, its intent was simply
unto himself"-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603 (citations omitted). In response to this turn of events, Representative Solarz and 34 other members of Congress introduced a resolution "to protect
the free exercise of religion." 136 CONG. REc. H5695 (daily ed. July 26, 1990) (introduction of H.R. 5377).
141
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Supreme Court held that South
Carolina could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to Sherbert, a Seventhday Adventist. Sherbert refused employment which required her to work on Saturday
because her religious faith forbade it. The Sherbert Court clearly stated that freedom of
religion might be infringed by "the denial of or plading of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege." Id. at 404. In holding that Sherbert should receive unemployment benefits,
the Supreme Court did not establish or foster the Seventh-day Adventist religion. The
Court's ruling thus fulfills the required governmental neutrality with regard to different
religions. Moreover, the recognition of Sherbert's rights did not discriminate against
any other person's religious freedom. Id. at 409-10; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment prevented a
state from forcing Amish children to attend high school until the age of 16. The Amish
demonstrated a sincere religious belief that such continued education would endanger
not only their religion, but also their way of life.
142
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
143
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
144 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700. The Court's classification of public land decisions as
"internal" is problematic. Public land comprises one-third of the land in the United
States. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND 37 (1970).
Seemingly absurd results will be achieved if management of this much land is considered internal. "Thus, trees become internal. Even mountains become internal." Falk,
supra note 90, at 551. The federal government is not only a trustee for the Indian tribes;
it also holds land in trust for all people. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537
(1911); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897). Governmental action
ceases to be purely internal when it alters the physical environment of its citizens. Shutflesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969).
145 See Falk, supra note 90, at 545.
146
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990); see supra notes 92 & 140 for further case discussion.
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to underscore the protections of the free exercise clause. Presuming that the free exercise clause constituted a reliable source of protection for Indian religion, 14 7 Representative Udall of Arizona
stated that AIRFA "has no teeth in it."148 Ironically, the Supreme
Court in Lyng quoted Representative Udall in support of its position
14 9
that AIRFA merely suggested policy objectives.
In addition to Lyng, Indians have brought many other free exercise claims challenging government use of public lands that contain
sacred sites.' 5 0 In these cases, courts have considered the extent to
which the first amendment protects Indian religion and religious
practices from government interference in its management of public
lands.' 5 ' None of these cases, however, has advanced or protected
Indian religious freedom.
The 1989 proposed amendment to AIRFA is a step toward protecting Indian sacred sites under an analysis similar to free exercise
clause analysis prior to Smith. Given that the Lyng decision allows
the government to defile and destroy sacred sites without constitutional restraint, Indians have been effectively forced to change their
religious behavior. By following the pattern outlined in traditional
free exercise clause cases, the 1989 amendment would help Indians
save their sacred sites.
B.

The Establishment Clause: Constitutionally Prohibited
Religious Accommodation

The proposed 1989 amendment should survive establishment
clause challenges. Such challenges can be expected from mining,
timber, ranching, and archaeological groups. 152 Indeed, these spe147
"Of course, in 1978, the year the act was passed, I could not have foreseen the
1988 Supreme Court decision in the Lyng case and its adoption of an extremely narrow
view of protection given to religious freedoms in the Constitution." 135 CONG. REC.
E898 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Udall).
148
124 CONG. REC. 21,445 (daily ed. July 18, 1978).
149 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
150 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1056 (1984); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska
1982), aff'd 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985),
reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 972 (1988); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd,
706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977),
aff'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
151 See Note, Native Americans'Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REv. 463 (1985) (authored by Erica Rosenberg) (analyzing free
exercise cases).
152
Cf HearingsS. 2250, supra note 36, at 367-68 (comments of the Society for American Archaeology). Indian groups have long accused archaeologists of being little more
than grave robbers. See id. at 98-99 (testimony of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
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cial interests argued that the previous 1988 amendment attempt violated the establishment clause, and their reaction to S. 1124 has
15 3
been no different.
1. Congress May Not Favor ParticularReligious Organizations
The establishment clause prohibition against governmental
religious advocacy demonstrates the interplay between the two religion clauses of the first amendment. Just as the free exercise clause
prohibits official discouragement of religion, "[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."'' 54 It is also one of
the oldest commands; this reasoning led to the abolition of most
denominational preference statutes at the state level by the
55
1780s.1
James Madison believed that free and equal competition among
religions secured freedom of religion.' 5 6 This concept requires that
legislators treat their own religions in the same way as "small, new,
or unpopular denominations."' 15 7 In Larson v. Valente, the Court
clearly held that government may not give preferential treatment to
particular religions.' 58 Statutes that favor certain religions are valid
only if narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.' 59 The
Larson standard applies where a statute shows denominational preference on its face. The Court distinguished Larson from other establishment clause doctrines, 160 stating that "the Lemon v. Kurtzman
'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all
religions, and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among
61
religions."'
Tribes of the Flathead Nation). See generally Margaret B. Bowman, The Reburialof Native
American Skeletal Remains: Approaches to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv.
147 (1989); Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Right vs. Indian Rights: Guidelinesfor Assessing
Competing Legal Interests in Native CulturalResources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437
(1986); Kristine Olson Rogers, Visigoths Revisited- The Prosecutionof Archaeological Resource
Thieves, Traffickers, and Vandals, 2J. ENvT. L. & LITIGATION 47 (1987).
A newly enacted law, the Native Amerian Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990), specifically protects Indian burial sites, prohibits trafficking in Native American human remains and cultural items, and gives ownership of such items found on federal or tribal lands to appropriate Indian groups. See
Grace Lichtenstein, Taking Back the Past, OUTSIDE MAC., Apr. 1991, at 108.
153 See Hearings S.1124, supra note 10 (statement of Scott M. Matheson, attorney,
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, on behalf of American Mining Congress et al.).
154 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, reh'g denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
155 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 104-19 (rev. ed. 1967).
156 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
157 Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.
158

Id.

159

Idiat 241-47.
See infra text accompanying notes 185-98.
Larson, 456 U.S. at 252 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

160

161
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Larson concerned a Minnesota statute that in effect distinguished between "well-established churches" and "churches which
are new and lacking in a constituency."' 62 The statute imposed certain registration and reporting requirements only upon religious organizations that solicited more than fifty percent of their funds from
nonmembers. The Court found that the statute was not facially neutral, 163 not closely tailored to meet a compelling state interest, 164
65
and, therefore, unconstitutional under the establishment clause.'
The Court explicitly distinguished Larson from Gillette v. United
States. 166 Gillette upheld section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service
Act, 167 which granted conscientious objector status to anyone who
opposed "participation in war in any form" based on religious belief. Section 6(j) distinguished between those persons religiously
opposed to all wars and those religiously opposed only to a particular war.16 8 The Larson Court explained that the statute in Gillette
"focused on individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affiliation."' 16 9 Regardless of his or her denomination, an individual
could qualify under section 6(j) if he or she held the requisite belief.
Accordingly, the Selective Service exemption "simply did not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation."' 170 The statute struck
down in Larson, in contrast, concentrated "precisely and solely upon
17 1
religious organizations."'
2.

The 1989 AIRFA Amendment Withstands a Larson Analysis

The language of S. 1124 singles out and protects Indian religions which hold federal land sites sacred.' 72 As a result, the
amendment appears to violate Larson's prohibition against treating
certain sects preferentially. Moreover, although the 1989 amendment specifies "Native American religions," not all Indian religions

170

Id. at 246 n.23.
Id
Id. at 251.
Id. at 255.
401 U.S. 437, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971).
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(j) (1988).
Id.
Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 n.23 (citing Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454).
Id. (citing Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450).

171

Id.

162

163
164
165
166
167
168

169

172 See Hearings S. 1124, supra note 10 (written testimony of Prof. David C. Williams,
Cornell Law School). This is not the first statute to single out religious activity on federal land for special consideration. In 1889, a criminal statute was enacted protecting
worship in Indian Territory from disturbance. Act of Mar. 1, 1888, ch. 333, § 22, 25
Stat. 783, 787. Congress was undoubtedly considering Christian religions when it
passed this law.

1991]

NOTE-SACRED SITES

1143

hold specific sites sacred. 17 3 In focusing its protection, the amendment creates a category of religions which hold certain sites on federal land historically sacred and indispensable. This category is not
forbidden by Larson because "[i]t includes some but not all Native
American religions, and it would include all site-specific non-Indian
174
religions, but there are none."'
While the "Native American religions" language of the amendment suggests an impermissible distinction among religions, the
practical effect of the language does not. The Court has established
that certain apparently discriminatory categories are permissible
where distinctions are not actually based on constitutionally impermissible criteria. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 175 the Court upheld a state
statute that excluded pregnancy from a work-loss compensation
scheme. The Court determined that the statute separated workers
into pregnant and nonpregnant categories, not female and male
ones. Even though one group in this classification system was exclusively female, its opposing group included both men and women.
The classification, the Court concluded, was therefore not based
17 6
upon gender "as such."'
Similarly, the proposed AIRFA amendment distinguishes between site-specific and nonsite-specific religions. While one category includes only Indian religions, the other category contains
both Indian and non-Indian religions. In Geduldig, there was no possibility of including men in the pregnant group, so the statute did
not mention them. Likewise, Congress has pointedly found that
there are no non-Indian religions that value sacred sites on federal
land. 17 7 Therefore, the amendment does not include them.
Characterized in this way, the 1989 AIRFA amendment compels a Gillette-type analysis. The statute challenged in Larson made
explicit distinctions between religious organizations. The 1989
amendment does not specify religious organizations; rather, it identifies groups of ideas and ceremonies concerning the sacredness of
land. An individual need not belong to a particular religious organization to have historically sacred and indispensable land protected.
This mirrors Gillette's distinction between individual conscienitious
173

The Native American Church is an example of an Indian religion which does not

have sacred sites. Hearings S. 1124, supra note 10.
174

Id.

175 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (superseded by statute as stated in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79 (1983)).
176 Id. at 496 n.20.

177 S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1), 135 CONG. REC. S6220 (1989). For a more
detailed discussion concerning the absence of any other religious group which values
sacred sites on federal land, see Hearings S. 1124, supra note 10 (written testimony of
Prof. David C. Williams, Cornell Law School).
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belief and sectarian affiliation. 178
To qualify for its protection, the amendment requires only that
an individual believe in the precepts of traditional Indian religion.
The amendment even provides for enforcement actions by individuals, not religious organizations.1 7 9 Additionally, the amendment
does not treat site-specific religions preferentially. Preference requires that the legislature treat one group better than another in
common areas.180 In Corporationof the PresidingBishop v. Amos,18 1 the
Court upheld Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which distinguishes between religions with employees and those without. According to the Court, this distinction involves no preference. 182 For
religions without employees, then, employment discrimination is
never an issue.
Likewise, the 1989 amendment protects sacred sites, but no
preference is involved in this protection. 183 There is no basis for
comparison between site-specific and nonsite-specific religions;
Congress will not waste energy protecting the sites of nonsitespecific religions. As one witness wrote in testimony on S. 1124:
"Rather than granting a preference, the statute merely treats differ184
ently those that are differently situated."'
C.

Neither Prohibited nor Required by the First Amendment
1. The Lemon Test for Religiously Neutral Statutes

Lemon v. Kurtzman' 8 5 articulated the starting point for establishment clause challenges to statutes that do not create facial denominational distinctions. Lemon established a three-prong test to
determine whether a statute unconstitutionally promotes religion in
general.186 First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second,
178

Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454.

179
180

S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c)(1), 135 CONG. REC. S6221 (1989).
See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

181
182

Id

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988)) gives a "uniform benefit to all religions." Amos,
483 U.S. at 339 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252, reh'g denied, 457 U.S.
1111 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
183
In fact, at least 121 permanent Christian churches are located on National Park
Service land. judiciary Hearing,supra note 42, at 114-22 (Churches in National Park System Areas).
184
Hearings S. 1124, supra note 10 (written testimony of Prof. David C. Williams,
Cornell Law School).
185 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In 1947, the Supreme Court held that "[i]n the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between church and state.'" Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). Today, this line
drawing is not so simple.
186 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. Actions from Rhode Island and Pennsylvania were
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its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and
third, the statute must not cause excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 8 7 A statute that fails any one of these
88
tests violates the establishment clause.'
Corporationof the PresidingBishop v. Amos 189 refined the Lemon test.
Although Lemon required that a law serve a secular purpose, Amos
held that the law's purpose need not be unrelated to religion. 190 A
permissible secular purpose under Amos could simply be "to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions."' 19 1
Regarding the second prong of the Lemon test, the Amos Court
held that the establishment clause allows "benevolent neutrality"' 92
on the part of the government, so long as such neutrality furthers
the free exercise of religion. Note that the establishment clause forbids only the government itself from promoting or inhibiting religion through its own actions. "A law is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very
purpose." 193
Texas Monthly v. Bullock19 4 recently affirmed this analysis. A plurality of the Supreme Court noted that although statutes that relate
"exclusively to religious organizations" are generally invalid under
the first two Lemon prongs, several exceptions to this rule exist. 195 A
statute that may "reasonably be seen as removing a significant stateimposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion" 196 may be constitutional. The Court explicitly placed the Amos statute in this category. 19 7 It reaffirmed Amos's holding that the secular purpose and
effect prongs are not violated by a statute that removes governmental interference from a religious practice.198
joined in this case, challenging the constitutionality of state aid to nonpublic schools.
The Supreme Court held both statutes unconstitutional under the religion clauses of the
first amendment because both involved excessive intermingling of church and state.
187 Id. at 612-13.
188

Id

189
190

483 U.S. 327 (1987).
Id at 337.

191

Idr

at 335.

Id at 334.
193
Id at 337 (emphasis in original).
194 489 U.S. 1 (1989). In Texas Monthly, a plurality of the Court struck down a statute
that exempted religious periodicals from state sales tax. The plurality held that the statute violated the establishment clause, and that the exemption was not required by the
free exercise clause.
195
Id at 15.
192

196
197

198

Id
Id at 15 n.8.
Id
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The AIRFA Amendment Passes All Three Prongs of the Lemon
Test
a.

The 1989 Amendment Serves a Secular Purpose

Under the first prong of the Lemon test, the AIRFA amendment
must serve a secular purpose. S. 1124 removes governmentimposed obstacles to Indian religious practice. The Court has identified this as a valid secular purpose,' 99 and has emphasized Congress's discretionary ability to accommodate free exercise values not
mandated by the first amendment.2 0 0 Similarly, in County ofAllegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court noted that "[g]overnment
efforts to accommodate religion are permissible when they remove
burdens on the free exercise of religion." 20 ' Past government management of public land constitutes a burden that has impeded and
20 2
frustrated the exercise of Indian religions.
Simply leaving the land undeveloped also serves a secular purpose. In a period of growing environmental concern, government
no longer has a mandate to develop all public land. Other statutes
have created a public policy in favor of leaving some public lands
untouched. 20 3 A general management scheme that leaves public
land pristine has no connection with the establishment clause.2 0 4 In
short, wilderness management does not establish a religion.
b.

The Amendment's Primary Effect Neither Advances nor Inhibits
Religion

The AIRFA amendment does not advance Indian religions.
Rather, it simply allows the practice of established religion to continue. The amendment avoids any appearance of promoting Indian
religions by balancing the protection of sacred sites against other
interests. Public land left undeveloped creates no change in legal
199

Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987); see text

accompanying note 191.
200
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971).
201
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3105
n.51 (1989); see Amos, 483 U.S. at 348.
202
See supra text accompanying notes 41-46, 68-70, 85-88.
203 See, e.g., Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c)
(1988); National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(f), 470h-2f (1988); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1988); National Forest Management Act of 1976,
16 U.S.C. § 1612 (1988); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)
(1988) (requiring agencies to facilitate public participation, consider alternatives, or
minimize harms to federal lands, forests, historic cites, and the environment generally);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(f), 1739(e)
(1988).
204 Cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (school access to both religious and
nonreligious groups did not violate the establishment clause); Falk, supra note 90, at
560.
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status at all. 20 5 In addition, the amendment does not allow Indian
tribes to dictate federal land management policy; it leaves the ultimate decisionmaking policy in the hands of the relevant agencies.
20 6
Any other policy would indeed be unconstitutional.
A wilderness management policy that leaves land undisturbed
would preserve the status quo of the environment. Such a policy
would only establish a religion if the status quo ante established a religion.20 7 It is impossible to suggest that the history of wilderness
management in the United States has been prefaced on religious
grounds. The very lack of sensitivity toward Indian religions belies
that idea. Given that the status quo is nonreligious, respecting the
status quo is also nonreligious.
There is legitimate concern that recognition of Indian religious
rights could paralyze the government's ability to manage and use
large amounts of federal property. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in
Lyng, acknowledged this concern. 20 8 Lobbying groups have expressed fears that Indians could exclude all human activity, save
their own, from these areas. These concerns, while valid, stem from
a clash between two different cultures-that of the dominant western culture, viewing land in terms of ownership and use, and that of
native American Indian tribes, wherein concepts of private property
are often completely alien. Unable to empathize with or perhaps
even understand the Indian view of religion, the Lyng Court sidestepped the issue of "otherness. ' ' 20 9 The Court refused to address
this intricate conflict, leaving the task to Congress. 2 10
c.

The Amendment Does Not Excessively Entangle Government and
Religion

Lemon's third prong requires that a statute not foster "excessive
205
"Where a public forum has been created, an 'equal access' policy, extending to
both religious groups and non-religious groups, is not incompatible with the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause cases." American Civil Liberties Union v. Wilkinson, 895
F.2d 1098, 1102 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
206 See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute that gave churches the power to veto applications for liquor licenses
within a 500-foot radius of a church; by vesting discretionary governmental powers in
religious bodies, the statute violated the establishment clause).
207 Falk, supra note 90, at 560-61.
208
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 473 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
209 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote: "It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree
about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the
Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live."
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (dissenting opinion). For a discussion of
the power of empathy in the Court's decisions, see Lynn N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1574 (1987).
210
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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governmental entanglement with religion." 2 11 The government,
however, is already institutionally involved with Indian religion. Of
crucial importance is whether the amendment adds to any entanglement that already exists under AIRFA.
Under the present version of AIRFA, federal agency administrators are required to consult with Indians and Indian religious
leaders. This consultation may prompt a federal administrator to
accord protection for Indian sacred sites. In Lyng, the Court never
suggested that this consultation constituted excessive entanglement.
To be sure, Lyng directly considered AIRFA and upheld it, even
though it singles out Indian religions for special treatment.
In fact, the Lyng Court twice intimated that future congressional
action should accommodate Indian religions in federal land management decisions. The Court stated:
The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile
the various competing demands on government, many of them
rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse
a society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for
2 12
the legislatures and other institutions.
Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated:
Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen. The Government's rights to the use of its own land, for example, need not and
should not discourage it from accommodating religious practices
2 13
like those engaged in by the Indian respondents.
The 1989 amendment would not change this consultation process.
Indian religion wraps itself around every aspect of Indian life;
religion is crucial for continuing tribal identity. 2 14 The federal government is intimately, and inevitably, involved with Indian and tribal
life. For official recognition, tribes must show an ongoing identity
as a separate, culturally unified group. 2 15 A specific federal agency,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, deals with the unique position of these
semisovereign, semidependent nations within the United States.
Amending AIRFA will not entangle the government with Indian
religion any more than it is already. Rather, the amendment acknowledges the separateness of the government and Indian
2
religions. 16

211
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
212 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452.
213
Id. at 453-54.
214
KENNETH LINCOLN & AL LOGAN SLAGLE, THE GOOD RED ROAD xix-xxiii (1987).
215
25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1990).
216
Another criticism of S. 1124 reflects Justice O'Connor's concerns in Lyng that the
Court would become entangled in deciding which practices were central to an Indian
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Congress should re-introduce and enact the proposed 1989
AIRFA amendment. The spirit of AIRFA reflects genuine sensitivity
toward a religious culture vastly different from others in the United
States. Without amendment, AIRFA goes no further than flowery,
ineffectual sentiment. The amendment's language, however, must
be narrowed to clarify the "legal responsibility" and "vested property rights" standards. Left undefined, this ambiguous language
could create a loophole that diminishes the amendment's value. Assuming that Congress refines this language, the 1989 amendment
will finally give Indians the ability to fight the destruction of their
sacred sites. 2 17 It does so by requiring federal agencies to balance
Indian religious interests against federal interests in making land
management decisions, and by creating a private cause of action for
judicial review of agency decisions. The amendment furthers the
free exercise of religion and does not violate the establishment
clause.
Before Congress considered the 1988 AIRFA amendment,

Alice Benally, of the Nakai Dine', Clauscheei clan of the Navajo Nation, expressed her determination to save her sacred lands. In her
words, "[t]he government is violating our religious ways, where our
offering places used to be. They are trying to take our religion away
from us. Everything we do comes with a song and a prayer.... We

will resist to the very end and defend our sacred land, preserve our
religion. ' 2 18 The AIRFA amendment cannot rectify past injustices.
It can, however, acknowledge the value of Indian religion and culture. At the very least, it offers Indians a chance to preserve their
sacred sites. Perhaps, at its outer limits, the amendment also rekin-

dles the American ideal of religious tolerance and understanding.
Kristen L. Boyles
religion. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58. This need not be the case. Giving plaintiffs the
burden of showing that a government decision would destroy a land site central to their
religion creates a presumption in favor of government action. Once the plaintiffs have
fulfilled their burden of proof, however, the government must defend its position. This
presumption of government legality eliminates the need for judicial evaluation of religion. For a more detailed discussion concerning the problems of constitutionally defining religion, see Note, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment: A FunctionalApproach, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 532 (1989) (authored by Ben Clements).
217 S.110, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) is a step in the right direction. Hopefully,
this current amendment will fare better than the rest. There is reason for optimism.
Even though the other amendments did not proceed to a full chamber vote, the repeated attempts in the last four years demonstrate a commitment by congressional and
tribal leaders to mold AIRFA into a useful, meaningful law. The resilience of the issue
bodes well for eventual change.
218 Hearings S. 2250, supra note 36, at 253-54 (1988 Affidavit of Alice Benally).

